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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(j). The
appeal is of an order, judgment, or decree of a court of record over which the Court of Appeals
does not have original appellate jurisdiction but is transferred by the Supreme Court to the Court
of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(4).
RESPONSE TO ISSUES PRESENTED
1. OBJECTION: The issues presented by Pinckney all fail to comply with the Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Utah Rules ofAppellate Procedure Rule 24(a)(5) requires either (A) a
citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or (B) a statement
ofgrounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. The statement of the
issues provided by Pinckney contain neither one.
2. Pinckney's first issue (under her "Issues Presented") was not determined by the trial
court. Pinckney failed to prove that Snideman was a tenant, so the court never arrived at the
issue of whether under such circumstances he would be a proper party. Rather, the court,
unconvinced that Snideman was a tenant, viewed the action as a disguised attempt to obtain a
more expeditious and favorable remedy than that provided under a trust deed foreclosure,
finding that the trustor, a corporation, was the real party in interest. Pinckney attempts to
convert the lower court's Finding of Fact #1 * and related factual determinations into an overgeneralized and inapplicable question of law. Pinckney's first issue, if purely a matter of law,
would be more properly stated, As an assignee under a trust deed, can a plaintiff force a more
bindings of Fact #1 states, "The real party in interest in this matter, rather than
Defendant John David Snideman is a corporation named Prodigy Enterprises, Inc." See
Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts for more detail.
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speedy favorable remedy for default by alleging a fictitious, oral lease between a corporate
trustor and its officer and thus avail itself of the use of the more expeditious remedies under the
unlawful detainer statutes.
3. Snideman does not need to be a party to a document to impose the reciprocal
enforcement of attorney's fees.
4. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are sufficient.
PROVISIONS DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL
A.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS, Utah Code Annotated 25-5-1
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term
not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning
real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created,
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed
by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by
writing.

B.

Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56.5 Attorney's Fees-Reciprocal rights to recover
Attorney's fees.
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written
contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the
provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other
writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees.

C.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(a)(5)
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain
under appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review,
including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with
supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was
preserved in the trial court; or
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an
issue not preserved in the trial court.
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 17(a)
Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant.
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 17(d)
Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two or
more persons associated in any business either as a joint-stock
company, a partnership or other association, not a corporation,
transact such business under a common name, whether it
comprises the names of such associates or not, they may sue or be
sued by such common name.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. NATURE OF THE CASE. THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. AND ITS
DISPOSITION. The trial court denied an unlawful detainer claim filed by Pinckney and
awarded Snideman his costs and a reasonable attorney's fee (Record at 111). After two hearings
(Record at 44, 107) on Pinckney's objections to the order, including, among other things, the
reciprocal imposition of attorney's fees, and after considering Pinckney's alternative proposed
findings and conclusions, the lower court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Order (Record at 111). Pinckney appealed to the Utah Supreme Court (Record at 112) and
filed a Motion for Summary Disposition. Snideman filed his Response in Opposition along with
a Utah Rules ofAppellate Procedure Rule 10 Motion for Summary Affirmation; Request for
Utah Rules ofAppellate Procedure Rule 33 Damages and Utah Rules ofAppellate Procedure
Rule 37 Suggestion of Mootness along with a Supporting Memorandum. On December 22,
1999, the Supreme Court deferred ruling on the motions and suspended Utah Rules ofAppellate
Procedure Rule 10(d). On January 12, 2000, the Supreme Court ordered the transfer of the
matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. Pursuant to order, a pre-hearing mediation
conference was held February 14, 2000. Pinckney's Brief was filed March 31, 2000.
2. PINCKNEY'S ORIGINAL CLAIM. Based on an assigned trust deed, Pinckney had
fashioned her complaint as an unlawful detainer of real property, seeking damages for nonpayment on an alleged oral lease, along with costs and attorney's fees and possession from
Snideman, a named officer of a corporation, Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. Her claim, however, was
based on a note and deed of trust with Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. as the real party in interest.
(Record at 3,4). At the same time, Pinckney was pursuing a trust deed foreclosure against the
Page 4

same property (Record 120, Transcript pg. 45, line 17-19). Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. alone was
the signatory to the Trust Deed. (Record, Exhibit #3)
3. SNIDEMAN'S POSITION. Snideman denied the existence of an oral lease or any
such tenancy. Snideman claimed that Pinckney's action in unlawful detainer was a disguised
attempt to obtain a more expeditious and favorable remedy by avoiding the statutory protections2
provided by a statutory trust deed foreclosure (Record 9, 120 transcript, pages 5-8). Pinckney
admitted that indeed, she would have no claim in unlawful detainer against the owner of the real
property, the real party in interest3. On appeal, Pinckney continues her pursuit of the fiction that
Snideman is a "renter" or a "tenant" even though its own drafted proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law states the opposite (Record at 53). Similarly inconsisentent, to fashion the
facts to support her appeal, and caught in her argument over the issue of attorney's fees,
Pinckney abandoned the fiction of an oral lease, asserting instead that "at the time of the
unlawful detainer action being filed, Pinckney's attorney thought there was a written lease
(Record, page 72). Contrary to such position, the complaint refers only to an oral lease in the
context of the Trust Deed. The complaint sought reasonable attorney's fees under the unlawful
detainer statute (Record 2-4).
4. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION. The trial court refrained from making a

2

Under Utah Code Annotated §57-1-31, a trustor has the right to cure within three
months of the filing of a notice of default and is entitled to notice of the Trustee's sale
and may bid thereon. The detailed procedural requirements for a trustee's sale of real
property are intended to protect the debtor/trustor, and provide protections that substitute
for the six-month right of redemption guaranteed injudicial mortgage foreclosures, Jones
v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
3

"If they have a deed showing that he bought it, we are dead."Record 120,
transcript, pages 9-10).
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finding of an oral or written lease or that Snideman was a tenant. By doing so, Pinckney's
fashioned claim of unlawful detainer was denied. After a bench trial, the trial court found that
the real party in interest, rather than Defendant Snideman was the then owner of the real
property, the corporation named Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. (Record, 109) The trial court denied
the unlawful detainer claim, and awarded Snideman its costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.
(Record, 111) Pinckney appealed. (Record, 113) Judge Hermansen, for the Trial Court, who
heard opening statements, testimony and cross examination of six different witnesses, and
closing arguments, succinctly stated:
The Court finds from the documentary evidence received, that the
real party in interest is the corporation (Record, 22).
Except Exhibit "5" (discussed later), no documentary evidence even closely identifies
Snideman as a Tenant.
5. OTHER RELEVANT FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. The court also found that
(finding #6) a non-judicial foreclosure of the subject trust deed is proceeding outside of the
present action and concludes (Conclusion #2) that issues about obligations owed, if any, is more
properly resolved in the foreclosure action. The court also made findings and conclusions as to
the basis and amount of attorney's fees4 to be awarded Snideman. (Record 22, 108, 109)
6. FACTS RELEVANT TO EXHIBIT 5, Pinckney's only claimed evidence of a lease

4

The record would show that the attorney's affidavit submitted after the first
hearing was voluntarily reduced by over $1,000.00 for the time spent on negotiations
regarding the default under the trust deed outside of the unlawful detainer action (Record
56-59). At the final hearing on objections, buy interlineation, the Court reduced the
award of attorney fees by an additional $1,000.00 to $3,418.03 as reasonable attorney's
fees for that matter (Record 107). Snideman would contend that he should be entitled to
the full amount, but has not raised the issue on appeal, leaving the question of the amount
within the discretion of the court.
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agreement is Exhibit "5". The court had ample justification to disregard it. The letter was on
Tretheway (Pinckney's counsel) law office's stationary (Record 120, transcript, page77, line 3).
From later testimony, Exhibit 5 was settlement discussion and inadmissable (Record 120,
transcript, page 77, line 23 through page 78, line 9). It was prepared, negotiated, and executed
after the instant litigation had commenced with a summons and complaint served (Record 120,
transcript, page 81, lines 9-12). It was prepared and typed by Mr. Tretheway (Record 120,
transcript page 81, line 17-23). Mr. Tretheway is not a disinterested party. He was Pinckney's
attorney (and attorney in this matter) and signed the Exhibit (Record 120, transcript, page 79,
Exhibit 5). Pinckney relied on Mr. Tretheway as to the security of the loan for which Mr.
Tretheway received a percentage (Record 120, transcript, pages 23-24). Mr. Tretheway received
an origination and guarantee fee from the sale of the property of $1,200.00. (Record 120,
transcript, pages 33-34). Mr. Tretheway testified that he would be liable to Pinckney if the
$20,000.00 was not paid, (Record 120, transcript, pages 33-34). Note payments were made to
Mr. Tretheway (Record 120, transcript, page 83). Mr. Tretheway provided legal advice to
Snideman, as well (Record 120, transcript, page 85). Snideman understood the payments
referred to therein to be mortgage payments (Record 120, transcript, page 40). Exhibit 5
mischaracterizes Snideman's payments as rent payments (Record 120, transcript page 83, line 824) It was prepared without the aid of counsel for Snideman (Record 120, transcript, page 85).
The document also misrepresented that a "default has been taken in the unlawful detainer
action", when, in fact, there was no entry of default (Record 120, transcript, page 88, lines 1620), a fact especially observed by the court (Record, page 22).
In her appeal, Pinckney seeks to ignore the trust deed-her only basis-and continues to
pursue the fiction of an oral lease. Her pellucid reason for avoidance, certainly, is that the trust
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deed points directly to the corporation as the real party in interest, sustaining the trial courts
decision. She also seeks to avoid the imposition of attorney's fees by disregarding the trust
deed. The appellate court should sustain the findings, conclusions and order of the trial court.
SUMMARY OF POINTS OF ARGUMENT
Pinckney "reaches" to formulate a question of law to overcome her failure to provide
evidence or convince the court of the essential elements of her claim and overcome the fact that
the corporation is the real party in interest. At the same time she was pursuing a trust deed
foreclosure, Pinckney's action in unlawful detainer was a disguised attempt to obtain a more
expeditious and favorable remedy. The trial court could never reach the issue of unlawful
detainer because Pinckney never established that Snideman was a tenant or that there was an
"oral" lease-instead, the only reliable evidence established the relationship of trustor/beneficiary
under the trust deed, of which the trustor was a corporation-pointing to it as the real party in
interest. Thus, the court held as a finding of fact that the corporation, not Snideman, was the real
party in interest and concluded that issues about obligations owed, if any, is more properly
resolved in the foreclosure action. Pinckney's failure is further evidenced by her failure to
comply with Utah Rules ofAppellate Procedure Rule 24 (a)(5), nor can she, since the issue was
never determined by the trial court nor preserved for appeal. Even if such issue were
appropriately determined and preserved, no reliable underlying factual evidence supports the
issue. The appellate court should defer to the trial court's factual determination. The authority
cited by Pinckney supports, rather than detracts from the lower court's findings.
Pinckney should not be able to avoid the reciprocal imposition of attorney's fees by
disclaiming the application of the document under which her complaint was brought and under
which she originally sought attorney's fees. The findings of fact and conclusions of law clearly
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provide the basis and authority for imposition of attorney's fees.
Pinckney's appeal is frivolous and just damages including reasonable attorney fees
should be awarded Snideman.
ARGUMENTS
1. PINCKNEY'S FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL WAS NOT DECIDED NOR REACHED
BY THE LOWER COURT
The trial court refrained from making a finding of an oral or written lease or that
Snideman was a tenant. Pinckney simply failed to carry its burden. Such lease or tenancy was
an essential element of fact to Pinckney's claim. No reliable evidence supported Pinckney's
factual claim-rather the evidence pointed to the Corporation being the real party in interest.
Snideman denied the existence of an oral lease or any such tenancy. Pinckney was also pursuing
a trust deed foreclosure on the same property. Snideman, the sole shareholder and officer of the
corporation owning the property, claimed that Pinckney's action in unlawful detainer was a
disguised attempt to obtain a more expeditious and favorable remedy by avoiding the statutory
protections5 provided by a statutory trust deed foreclosure (Record 9, 120 transcript, pages 5-8).
The court agreed with Snideman by its findings and conclusions. After a bench trial, the trial
court found that the real party in interest, rather than Defendant Snideman was the then owner of
the real property, the corporation named Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. (Record, 109). The court also
found that a foreclosure of the subject trust deed was proceeding outside of the present action

5

Under Section 57-1-31, Utah Code Annotated, a trustor has the right to cure
within three months of the filing of a notice of default and is entitled to notice of the
Trustee's sale and may bid thereon. The detailed procedural requirements for a trustee's
sale of real property are intended to protect the debtor/trustor, and provide protections that
substitute for the six-month right of redemption guaranteed injudicial mortgage
foreclosures, Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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and concluded that issues about obligations owed, if any, is more properly resolved in the
foreclosure action. Pinckney's fashioned claim of unlawful detainer was denied. Pinckney's
first issue (under her "Issues Presented") was not determined by the trial court, rather, the trial
court made no determination of the existence of a lease or tenancy.
2. PINCKNEY'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE AND ATTEMPT TO
FRAME HER ISSUE DOES NOT COMPORT WITH THE FACTS.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24 (a)(5) requires either (A) a citation to the
record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or (B) a statement of grounds for
seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. The statement of the issues provided
by Pinckney contain neither one. Without the same, Sr'deman's response may be unnecessarily
broad.
Pinckney in presenting her first issue appears to attempt to convert the lower court's
Finding of Fact #1 6 and related factual determinations into an over-generalized and inapplicable
question of law. Pinckney's first issue, if purely a matter of law, would be more properly stated,
As an assignee under a trust deed, can a plaintiff force a more speedy favorable remedy for
default by alleging a fictitious, oral lease between a corporate trustor and its officer and thus
avail itself of the use of the more expeditious remedies under the unlawful detainer statutes?
Or, in application to the facts of the instant case
Can a Plaintiff force a more speedy favorable conclusion by the use of the more
expeditious remedies under the Unlawful Detainer Statutes as an assignee under a Trust Deed,
and avoid the protections (right to cure default, right to notice of default, right to notice of sale,
6

Findings of Fact #1 states, "The real party in interest in this matter, rather than
Defendant John David Snideman is a corporation named Prodigy Enterprises, Inc." See
Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts for more detail.
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and right of redemption) afforded the real party in interest, the property owner (which is a
Corporation) by treating the payments under the trust deed as payments of rent under an oral,
fictitious, lease between an officer of the Corporation and the Corporation?
The answer to either issue, obviously, is a resounding "NO".
Pinckney admitted that indeed, she would have no claim in unlawful detainer against the
owner of the real property7. On appeal, Pinckney continues her pursuit of the fiction that
Snideman is a "renter" or a "tenant" even though her own drafted proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law states the opposite (Record at 53). Similarly inconsistent, to fashion the facts
to support her appeal, and caught in her argument over the issue of attorney's fees, Pinckney
abandoned the fiction of an oral lease, asserting instead that "at the time of the unlawful detainer
action being filed, Pinckney's attorney thought there was a written lease (Record, page 72).
Contrary to such position, the complaint refers only to an oral lease in the context of the Trust
Deed and sought reasonable attorney's fees under the unlawful detainer statute (Record 2-4).
The actions and various positions of Pinckney not only militate against denial of appeal, but for
imposition of sanctions, as previously made by motion to the Utah Supreme Court, now pending
before the Court of Appeals.
3. DEFERENCE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL DETERMINATION
SHOULD BE MADE UNLESS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
The appellate court should defer to the trial court's assessment and determination of
factual matters. Judge Hermansen, for the Trial Court, who heard opening statements, testimony
and cross examination of six different witnesses, and closing arguments, succinctly stated:

7

"If they have a deed showing that he bought it, we are dead."Record 120,
transcript, pages 9-10).
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The Court finds from the documentary evidence received, that the
real party in interest is the corporation (Record, 22).
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 17(a) requires every action to be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 17(d) regarding associated
parties specifically excludes Corporations from its application. Even though Snideman owned
all, or practically all, of the stock of the corporation, such a fact does not qualify him as the real
party in interest, Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979).
Snideman, despite his association with the Corporation, was not the real party in interest and
could not be liable for what the court found to be a corporate concern-notwithstanding the effort
of Pinckney to create a fictitious, oral8 lease.
4. EXHIBIT "5" SHOULD BE DISREGARDED.
Pinckney's only claimed evidence of a lease agreement relies on Exhibit "5" a letter on
Tretheway (Pinckney's counsel) law office's stationary (Record 120, transcript, page77, line 3).
The court had ample justification to disregard it:
A.

Settlement Discussion is Inadmissable. From later testimony, Exhibit 5 was
settlement discussion and inadmissable (Record 120, transcript, page 77, line 23
through page 78, line 9).

B.

Facts can yt be "built" by subsequently created documents. It was prepared,
negotiated, and executed after the instant litigation had commenced with a
summons and complaint served (Record 120, transcript, page 81, lines 9-12).

C.

8

Presumptions go against its creator, Pinckney's attorney. It was prepared and

Even if Pinckney had submitted evidence as to an oral lease, such would also fail
due to the Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Annotated §25-5-1.
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typed by Mr. Tretheway (Record 120, transcript page 81, line 17-23).
D.

Pinckney had an unfair advantage in its creation. Mr. Tretheway is not a
disinterested party. He was Pinckney's attorney (and attorney in this matter) and
signed the Exhibit (Record 120, transcript, page 79, Exhibit 5).

E.

Pinckney relied on Creator's legal acumen to maintain security. Pinckney relied
on Mr. Tretheway as to the security of the loan for which Mr. Tretheway received
a percentage (Record 120, transcript, pages 23-24).

F.

Snideman also received legal advice from Tretheway, its creator. Mr. Tretheway
provided legal advice to Snideman (Record 120, transcript, page 85).

G.

Mr. Tretheway had a personal interest not disclosed in the document. Mr.
Tretheway received an origination and guarantee fee from the sale of the property
of $1,200.00. (Record 120, transcript, pages 33-34).

H.

Mr. Tretheway had a personal liablity not disclosed in the document. Mr.
Tretheway testified that he would be liable to Pinckney if the $20,000.00 was not
paid, (Record 120, transcript, pages 33-34).

I.

Mr. Tretheway was a participant in the underlying transaction. Note payments
were made to Mr. Tretheway (Record 120, transcript, page 83).

J.

The document fails to reflect the understanding of the parties. Snideman
understood the payments referred to therein to be mortgage payments (Record
120, transcript, page 40).

K.

The document has no basis in fact as to essential elements. Exhibit 5
mischaracterizes Snideman's payments as rent payments (Record 120, transcript
page 83, line 8-24)
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L.

Overreaching. It was prepared without the aid of counsel for Snideman. (Record
120, transcript, page 85).

M.

The document misrepresented key-material facts. The document also
misrepresented that a "default has been taken in the unlawful detainer action",
when, in fact, there was no entry of default (Record 120, transcript, page 88, lines
16-20), a fact especially observed by the court (Record, page 22).

5. THE AUTHORITY CITED BY PINCKNEY SUPPORTS, RATHER THAN
DETRACTS FROM THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS.
The authority cited by Pinckney supports, rather than detracts from the lower court's
findings, making perhaps a more compelling argument for Snideman. In the sole authority cited
by Pinckney on this issue, Pearce v. Schurtz, 270 P2d 442 (Utah 1954), page 443, the bond for
deed (then used similarly as a trust deed)
"expressly provided that upon default the buyer at seller's election
became at once a tenant at will of the seller".
In Pearce, the court found that
"this provision was undoubtedly adopted to obtain the benefits of
the unlawful detainer statute. Such was the express provision of
the contract and this court will not rewrite the agreement. It is not
within our province to torture some other meaning out of the bond
for deed..."
Even with the express provision, the Supreme Court in Pearce was divided and had
difficulty imposing the unlawful detainer provisions under circumstances arising from a Deed of
Conveyance. Justice Crockett in Pearce in his extensive dissenting opinion believed that
notwithstanding the express provision "the artificial relationship of tenancy at will was not
created, and the action of unlawful detainer should be dismissed."
The express provision contained in Pearce creating a tenancy is not present in the instant
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case. No such provision is contained in the trust deed or any other document. Indeed, in her
Complaint, Pinckney attempted to torture the note and trust deed of a purchase transaction into
an "oral " lease agreement and thereby obtain the benefits of the unlawful detainer statute. The
court in Pearce would not permit the facts to be tortured to avoid the unlawful detainer statute.
A fortiori, the trial court in the instant matter should not countenance Pinckney's torture of the
facts to bring it within the unlawful detainer statute and the appellate court should uphold the
decision of the trial court.
6. RESPONSE TO PINCKNEY'S SECOND ISSUE, MORE PROPERLY STATED AS,
CAN PINCKNEY AVOID THE RECIPROCAL IMPOSITION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES BY
DISCLAIMING THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCUMENT UNDER WHICH HER
COMPLAINT WAS BROUGHT AND UNDER WHICH SHE ORIGINALLY SOUGHT
ATTORNEY'S FEES?
The trial court made findings and conclusions as to the basis and amount of
attorney's fees9 to be awarded Snideman. (Record 22, 108, 109) The lower court found, after
stating its findings as to the position of the parties with respect to certain documents that
"7. The subject All-inclusive Trust Deed Note and All Inclusive
Trust Deed provide for at least one party to recovery (sic) attorney
fees, [and] 8. The reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded
Defendant in this matter is the sum of $3,418.03."
It concluded that
"3. Under Section 78-27-56.5, the Court may award attorney's fees
to the prevailing party [and] 4. Defendant should be awarded its

9

The record would show that the attorney's affidavit submitted after the first
hearing was voluntarily reduced by over $1,000.00 for the time spent on negotiations
regarding the default under the trust deed outside of the unlawful detainer action. At the
final hearing on objections, buy interlineation, the Court reduced the award of attorney
fees by an additional $1,000.00 to $3,418.03 as reasonable attorney's fees for that matter.
Snideman would contend that he should be entitled to the full amount, but has not raised
the issue on appeal, leaving the question of the amount within the discretion of the court.
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costs and a reasonable attorney's fees."
The order appealed from reflects such findings and conclusions.
U.C.A. Section 78-27-56.5 states that
"A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees."
The essential elements of the statute are certainly fulfilled. Snideman prevailed in a civil
action based upon a trust deed executed after April 28, 1986 which provided for Pinckney to
recover attorney's fees. The statute imposes no requirement that the prevailing party be a party
to the writing, as contended by Pinckney, with good reason. Otherwise, any defendant that
prevails against a writing by proving its inefficacy would be denied its recovery of attorney's
fees-rendering the statute meaningless.
Pinckney contends error since Snideman was not a party to the Agreement, yet in
her complaint she seeks attorney's fees from Snideman. Pinckney claims that since she failed to
convince the court to adopt the fiction of an oral lease construed from the Trust Deed, that her
failure disposes of any basis for reciprocal attorney fees. Even though her Complaint (Record,
2-4) refers extensively to the All-inclusive Trust Deed which is the basis of her Complaint and is
the only document by which she sought attorney's fees in her original Complaint, Pinckney
contends that on appeal, there is no note, contract, or other writing, and thus no attorney fees.
The statute does not condition the reciprocal rights of attorneys fees upon a Defendant
proving the viability of an unfavorable document imposed upon him by a Plaintiffs suit. The
statute should not be construed to deny a Defendant its reciprocal right of attorney fees if in his
defense, he convinces the court to disregard, nullify, void, or determine the non-existence of
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such unfavorable document-or, as in this case, to disregard the fiction of a lease.
Similarly, in 4447 Associates v. First Security Financial 973 P.2d 992 (Court of Appeals
of Utah, January 22, 1999), the non-prevailing party attempted to avoid the imposition of
attorney's fees. There, an agreement providing for attorney's fees had been extinguished and
replaced by an agreement (that did not provide for attorney's fees) upon which suit was made.
The extinguished agreement provided for attorney's fees for actions "arising from" the same.
The appellate court held that uAt bottom, Zions/4447 brought this suit to enforce the payment
terms of [the extinguished agreement]". The appellate court, in 4447 Associates not only
affirmed the trial court in awarding attorney fees, but also awarded attorney fees on appeal.
Pinckney's authority is not on point and is distinguishable. Maynard v. Wharton, 912
P2d 446) denied attorney's fees because "Seller's did not establish that buyers defaulted on any
covenant or agreement and thus have no basis for an award of attorney fees." Such elements are
not present in the instant case. Wardley Corporation v. Welsh, 962 P2d 86, dealt with third-party
beneficiaries and declined to address arguments made as to U.C.A.78-27-56.5.
Pinckney claimed attorney's fees in her Complaint. Her basis was the Trust
Deed. She should now be estopped from claiming its inapplicability. To fail to do so would
render Section 78-27-56.5 meaningless. To fail to do so would mean that any potential Plaintiff
with any contract providing attorney's fees for its enforcement could sue without fear of the
imposition of Section 78-27-56.5. For under Pinckney's theory, if a Defendant raises a claim of
any sort that might render the contract invalid or otherwise negated and prevails on that claim,
the Plaintiff-the losing party-could then avoid the imposition of attorney's fees by claiming "no
contract, thus no attorney's fees". Certainly, such is not contemplated by the statute.
7. PINCKNEY, IN HER ARGUMENT OVER HER ISSUE #2 CLAIMS
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INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AS TO ATTORNEY'S FEES, YET HAS FAILED TO
PROPERLY RAISE SUCH ISSUE ON APPEAL.
The issue has not been properly raised, being "added in" Pinckney's claimed issue of
law. Furthermore, Pinckney has not fulfilled the requirement of marshalling the evidence with
regard to the same. Had she marshalled the evidence, she would have found several copies of
the affidavit for attorney's fees, the earliest of which was date-stamped September 20, 1999
(Record 120, transcript 56-59). Though Pinckney received a copy on July 6, 1999 (record, page
101), she apparently is concerned that the court has still not located the original that was
delivered to the Court on July 6, 1998, by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested and received
by one "JM". Snideman should not be penalized for a court's apparent administrative mistake.
Furthermore, the matter was discussed in open court (Record, 107) with the fees reduced by an
additional $1,000.00. In any event, the court having heard the case could make its independent
determination of what would constitute a reasonable attorney's fee. It apparently did so, thus the
reduction by interlineation.
8. RESPONSE TO PINCKNEY'S THIRD ISSUE, THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER PROVIDE FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
As previously stated in response to Pinckney's Issue 2, the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (Record, 110) contain the essential elements for the award of attorney's
fees.
The lower court found, after stating its findings as to the position of the parties with
respect to certain documents that
"7. The subject All-Inclusive Trust Deed Note and All Inclusive
Trust Deed provide for at least one party to recovery (sic) attorney
fees, [and] 8. The reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded
Defendant in this matter is the sum of $3,418.03."
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It concluded that
"3. Under Section 78-27-56.5, the Court may award attorney's fees
to the prevailing party [and] 4. Defendant should be awarded its
costs and a reasonable attorney's fees."
The order appealed from reflects such findings and conclusions.
Pinckney's contentions approach the absurd on this issue and become frivolous without
factual basis. The Findings, Conclusions, and Order are clear on the theory of attorney's fees
being awarded. Pinckney's failure to prove her case should not impose an obligation on
Snideman to prove part of Pinckney's case in order to benefit from the reciprocal award of
attorney's fees. The authority cited by Pinckney, Maynard V. Wharton, 912 P.2d 446 (Utah Ct.
App.), cert. Denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996) that Snideman " must show that the contract's
provisions contemplate that award" simply is oxymoronic when considered against Utah Code
Annotated, §78-27-56.5, the reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees, designed to prevent
drafting documents denying reciprocal rights.
9. PINCKNEY'S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS AND JUST DAMAGES INCLUDING
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED
The Supreme Court deferred consideration of Snideman's Request for Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure Rule 33 Damages and Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 37
Suggestion of Mootness. Argument regarding the same are not here repeated. As the appellate
court, in 4447 Associates not only affirmed the trial court in awarding attorney fees, but also
awarded attorney fees on appeal, so should the same be awarded Snideman.
CONCLUSION
From a bench trial, the trial court denied an unlawful detainer claim filed by Pinckney
and awarded Snideman his costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. Though fashioned as an
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unlawful detainer claim on an oral lease, her claim was based on a note and deed of trust with
Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. against whom, at the same time, Pinckney was pursuing a trust deed
foreclosure. Snideman, the sole shareholder and officer of Prodigy, denied the existence of an
oral lease or any such tenancy, claiming that Pinckney's action in unlawful detainer was a
disguised attempt to obtain a more expeditious and favorable remedy than the ongoing trust deed
foreclosure. No reliable evidence supported the existence of an oral lease or tenancy. The trial
court found the corporation, rather than Snideman, to be the real party in interest. The court also
found that foreclosure of the subject trust deed was proceeding outside of the present action,
concluding that issues about obligations owed, if any, is more properly resolved in the
foreclosure action. The court also made findings and conclusions as to the basis and amount of
attorney's fees to be awarded Snideman, based on the statutory reciprocal rights to recover
attorney's fees.
On appeal, Pinckney seeks to ignore the trust deed-her only basis-and continues to
pursue the fiction of an oral lease. The trust deed points directly to the corporation as the real
party in interest, sustaining the trial courts decision. She also seeks to avoid the imposition of
attorney's fees by again disregarding the trust deed and further disclaiming any agreement
between the parties-inconsistent with her claim and her earlier argument.
The appellate court should defer to the trial court's factual determination. Pinckney
relies on a single authority, Pearce, as permitting an unlawful detainer to be pursued against
Snideman. Pearce, however, is factually different and frankly supports the position of Snideman
rather than Pinckney.
Pinckney should not be able to avoid the reciprocal imposition of attorney's fees by
disclaiming the application of the document under which her complaint was brought and under
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which she herself originally sought attorney's fees. The findings of fact and conclusions of law
clearly provide the basis and authority for imposition of attorney's fees.
The appellate court should not only uphold the trial court's order in all respects, but
should also consider and grant Snideman's motion for sanctions.
NO ADDENDUM IS REQUIRED UNDER Utah Rules ofAppellate Procedure RULE
24(a)(ll).
Respectfully submitted,
Date

Thomas J. Klc, Attorney for
Appellee Snideman
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